Harley Davidson of Northern Utah v. Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services, and Brandi L. Mason: Reply Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Harley Davidson of Northern Utah v. Workforce
Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services,
and Brandi L. Mason: Reply Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Denver C. Snuffer Jr.; Daniel B. Garriott; Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Suzan Pixton; Attorney for Respondent Department of Workforce Services. Richard M. Hymas;
Nielsen & Senior; Attorneys for Respondent Brandi L. Mason.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Harley Davidson v. Workforce Appeals Board, No. 20040106 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4794
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—000O000— 
HARLEY DAVIDSON OF 
NORTHERN UTAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD, 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, and BRANDI L. MASON, 
Respondents. 
No. 20040I06-CA 
PRIORITY NO.: 14 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the Decision of the Utah Workforce Appeals Board 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.(3032) 
Daniel B. Garriott (9444) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE 
& POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Suzan Pixton 
140 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 45244 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244 
Attorneys for Respondent Department of 
Workforce Services 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harley Davidson 
of Northern Utah 
Richard M. Hymas 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
POBox 11808 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0808 
Attorneys for Brandi L. Mason, 
Respondent 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—000O000-
HARLEY DAVIDSON OF 
NORTHERN UTAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD, 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, and BRANDI L. MASON, 
Respondents. 
No. 20040106-CA 
PRIORITY NO.: 14 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the Decision of the Utah Workforce Appeals Board 
Denver C. Snuffer , Jr.(3032) 
Daniel B. Garriott (9444) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE 
& POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harley Davidson 
of Northern Utah 
Suzan Pixton 
140 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 45244 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244 
Attorneys for Respondent Department of 
Workforce Services 
Richard M. Hymas 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
PO Box 11808 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0808 
Attorneys for Brandi L. Mason, 
Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Petitioner, Harley Davidson of Northern Utah submits this reply brief in support of 
appeal before this Court. 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
The Petitioner 
Harley Davidson of Northern Utah, a Utah Corporation 
The Respondents 
Department of Workforce Services, 
Brandi L. Mason 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. The Findings of Fact Are Not in Question 1 
II. Respondent Was Terminated for Just Cause 3 
A. Ms. Mason is Culpable 5 
B. Ms. Mason Had the Requisite Knowledge 9 
C. Ms. Mason Had Control of Her Decisions 11 
II. Having Met All Requirements, Ms. Mason Was Terminated With Just Cause, and 
Benefits Should Be Denied 12 
CONCLUSION 14 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Court Cases and Other Authorities 
Buickv. Department of Employment Sec, 752 P.2d 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 12 
Grinnell v. Board of Review, 732 P.2d 113 (Utah 1987) 3 
Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986) 13 
Nelson v. Department of Employment Sec., 801 P.2d 158 (Utah App. 1990) 3 
Northwest Foods v. Board of Review, 731 P.2d 470 (Utah 1986) 13 
Constitutions, Statutes, and Regulations 
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(2)(a) (2004) 3 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-201 (2003) 3 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-202 (2005) 3 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-202(1) (2005) 5, 6 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-202(2) (2005) 9, 10 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-202(3) (2005) 11 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-208(1) (2005) 6, 7 
iii 
ARGUMENT 
L The Findings of Fact Are Not in Question. 
Respondent incorrectly argues that Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence to 
appropriately challenge the findings of fact issued by the ALJ and the Board, when that does 
not apply here. The controlling findings of fact are not in dispute. Those that are in dispute 
have no relevance on this appeal. Petitioner does not challenge the ALJ's findings of fact, 
rather it challenges their application of the undisputed facts to the law. That challenge does 
not require such marshaling of the facts as has been argued by Respondent. It is rather, the 
application of the facts the ALJ used in justifying a denial of just cause to terminate an 
employee which is an argument of law. 
This employee was someone who deliberately broke a promise to the owner of the 
company, and then went behind that owner's back to obtain "permission," not to break the 
promise, but to rectify a situation she caused which breached the very obligation she had 
promised to keep. It is not disputed that Ms. Mason had an extensive problem clocking in 
and out. She was the single worst offender in the entire company. It is not disputed that she 
had been reprimanded for that problem because of her repeated offenses of the employer's 
policy. It is not disputed that in an attempt to correct the problem, a promise had been 
exacted of her by the owner of the company to not to forget to clock in and out. It is further 
not disputed that she broke that promise. Those are the facts established in the record. While 
there are other facts that support a reversal of the ALJ's decision, they are not relevant to this 
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appeal. Those facts which are relevant are sufficient to establish just cause for termination. 
And just cause for termination should have been found by the ALJ. It was a legal error for 
the ALJ to fail to make that finding. 
Respondent has introduced argument in reliance upon peripheral issues that while they 
may tend to support it's desired conclusion, are not applicable to the actual appeal before the 
Court. No matter how you spin it, Ms. Mason had been warned to correct her behavior. She 
was the single worst offending employee. It was so bad that the owner/employer required 
a promise that she comply with the employer's rules. She made that promise. Then she 
broke it. She failed to correct her behavior even after warnings, and a final chance with an 
accompanying promise. That is just cause enough for termination. 
Additionally, there is the issue that she went behind her employer's back to obtain 
"permission" to violate the promise to correct her failure. Without disclosure of the promise, 
that "permission" was obtained through knowing, deceitful artistry. That also provides the 
employer with sufficient just cause for her termination. The decision of the ALJ misapplied 
the law and it should be reversed. 
Petitioner readily recognizes that Ms. Mason claims she obtained permission from her 
supervisor to clock in on a day she was not at work. But she never obtained permission to 
break her promise to Mr. Timmons, who was her ultimate employer. She never disclosed to 
her supervisor that such a promise even existed before she obtained the alleged "permission" 
to clock in on a day she was not at work. That is just cause for termination. The facts 
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relevant to the appeal are not in dispute, only their application to the law. Ms. Mason had 
knowledge of the promise, that is not disputed. Ms. Mason certainly recognized that she 
broke the promise, demonstrating her own culpability. Ms. Mason further had control over 
whether or not she could break that promise. Harley Davidson had just cause to terminate 
her employment. The decision of the ALJ and the Board should be reversed. 
II. Respondent Was Terminated for Just Cause. 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 3 5 A-4-405(2)(a) of the Act 
provide, in part that 
"[a] separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in 
determining the date the employment ended. Benefits shall be denied if the 
claimant was discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in 
connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which as 
deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful 
interest. However, not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial 
of benefits. A just cause discharge must include some fault on the part of the 
worker." 
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-201 (2003) (emphasis added). 
An employee is terminated for just cause if three factors are met: "(1) culpability, (2) 
knowledge of expected conduct, and (3) control over the offending conduct." Nelson v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah App. 1990); accord Grinnellv. 
Board of Review, 732 P.2d 113, 114 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); see also Utah Admin. Code 
994-405-202 (2005). All three elements are satisfied for both causes of termination. Each 
of these three factors were met on several levels. They were met as she continued to fail to 
clock in and out properly, they were met as she directly disobeyed her employer, and they 
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were met when she went behind her employer's back to obtain "permission" to correct her 
failure. 
Ms. Mason (the "Respondent" or the "employee") was repeatedly told that she must 
clock in when she arrived to work and clock out when she left. The employee was repeatedly 
told this because she failed to clock in or clock out on numerous occasions. She was the 
single worst offender. In fact, after having been reprimanded on the issue, she directly 
promised her employer/owner that she would correct this behavior, but did not. Her failings, 
if adopted by the general body of workers for the employer, would lead to chaos in the 
company. This is not a trivial matter for the employer. The fact that a final chance to comply 
was extended to Ms. Mason, along with getting her promise to comply, does not mean that 
she was a good employee being treated unfairly. She could have been discharged when the 
final warning was given. Instead, she promised to follow the company policy and to no 
longer engage in filing false check-in/check-out records. 
Respondent appears to argue that there could not be any fault in failing to clock in and 
out. Respondent argues that simple forgetfulness could not amount to fault. The fact is, she 
had forgotten to properly clock in and out so many times before that her employer had 
addressed the matter directly with her. She had been reprimanded for this consistent 
violation of the policy. She was the single worst offender in the company. She violated the 
policy so many times, that her employer had exacted a promise of Ms. Mason that she would 
not forget again. If this were a one time failure, these parties would not be before this Court. 
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The established fact is, that Ms. Mason repeatedly had failed to obey the rules of her 
employer. That failure, in and of itself, was sufficient to establish just cause for termination. 
The policy is necessary to prevent chaos in record-keeping by the employer. If the policy 
were allowed to go unenforced, it could lead to numerous labor violations or claims of labor 
violations by the employer. It is a significant and necessary part of the company's right to 
manage its affairs. And Ms. Mason was directly challenging and defying that right. 
Additionally, however, she had another employee clock her in on July 23,2003, a day 
when she admittedly did not work after she had made her promise. This also is just cause 
for termination. Although the AL J found that the employee was told by a supervisor that she 
could have another employee clock her in on a day she was not at work, she did not advise 
the supervisor of her promise to the owner/employer when she allegedly obtained that 
permission. In short, she lied to get permission. If she wanted permission, she should have 
either gone to Mr. Timmons, or alternatively disclosed that the promise had been made to Mr. 
Timmons and had her supervisor ask him. She did neither. 
Both of these are grounds for termination. There was a clear expectation of 
performance that could be easily met by Ms. Mason. She failed to do so on several levels 
providing the employer just cause for termination. 
A. Ms. Mason is Culpable. 
The employee is definitely culpable. Rule 994-405-202(1) states in pertinent part: 
"The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If 
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the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no 
expectation that it would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be 
shown. The claimant's prior work record is an important factor in determining 
whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good faith error in 
judgment." 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-202(1) (2005). 
It was Ms. Mason that failed to properly clock in and out on July 21,2003. It was Ms. 
Mason, and no other person, that had promised her employer that she would not forget to do 
that again. It was Ms. Mason that went behind her employer's back to obtain "permission" 
to have another employee clock her in on a day she was not at work. The conduct causing 
the discharge was not a single isolated incident. It was a continued pattern of behavior for 
which she had been warned and for which she had promised to correct. Failure to clock in 
and out properly certainly jeopardizes an employer's rightful interests in having accurate 
records and avoiding chaos in their compliance with employment laws. It causes additional 
work to be done to correct those failures. It allows for the opportunity to be dishonest in 
reporting time. It makes the employer's records inaccurate. It creates an element of distrust 
between employer and employee. It further demonstrates blatant disregard for the 
employer's rules, regulations, and authority. It affects the ability to maintain discipline and 
order in an employer's workplace, which is culpability. 
Utah Administrative Rules further provide that unemployment benefits can be denied 
for violation of employment rules, such as those violated by Ms. Mason. Pertinent portions 
of Rule 994-405-208 of the Utah Administrative Code provide significant insight. 
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"(1) Violation of Company Rules. 
If an individual violates a reasonable employment rule and the three elements 
of culpability, knowledge and control are satisfied, benefits shall be denied. 
(a) An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that 
further legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public 
policy or that infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals 
may not be reasonable. If a worker believes a rule is unreasonable, the worker 
generally has the responsibility to discuss these concerns with the employer 
before engaging in conduct contrary to the rule, thereby giving the employer 
an opportunity to address those concerns. When rules are changed, the 
employer must provide appropriate notice and afford workers a reasonable 
opportunity to comply. 
(b) If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment 
contract or collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established 
if the discharge is consistent with the provisions of the contract. 
(c) Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were 
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However, 
if a worker was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further 
violations may result in a denial of benefits. 
(d) Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of 
itself, cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the 
employer's ability to maintain necessary discipline." 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-208(1) (2005). 
It certainly is reasonable to require employees to clock in and out, and such a rule 
promotes the legitimate business interests of an employer, as mentioned above. Respondent 
has argued that this was a habitual offense, and that it was condoned by the employer. The 
offense was somewhat habitual as to this offending employee, having occurred fairly 
regularly over the course of the almost two years Ms. Mason worked for Harley Davidson. 
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But the employer never approved that practice and reprimanded her for the offenses. Ms. 
Mason was warned on many occasions that such conduct could not be tolerated. Only to that 
extent could it be argued that the fixing of the problem demonstrates "condoning" it. Ms. 
Mason also testified that Mr. Timmons required a promise of her to correct her performance. 
In other words, she was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated in accordance 
with paragraph (c) of those rules. Id. at ^ (c). 
Furthermore, she got other employees involved with the correction of her 
disobedience only amplifies that Ms. Mason was causing the employer to maintain necessary 
discipline. As paragraph (d) directly provides, that in and of itself establishes culpability. Id. 
at 1j(d). 
Were this a single incident of forgetfulness, the severity of forgetting to clock in and 
out might not be sufficient to warrant termination. That is not this case, however. So such 
an entirely hypothetical inquiry has no meaning here. The facts of the matter show that this 
was not a single incident. Culpability is certainly demonstrated. 
Respondent argues this failure may somehow be relieved by the alleged "permission" 
she received from her supervisor to correct the failure. Breach of the promise to Mr. 
Timmons occurred long before she ever obtained the alleged permission from her supervisor 
to have another employee clock her in on a day she was not at work. That cannot have 
happened when she never even disclosed the promise to the supervisor. 
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Furthermore, this was not an isolated incident, the employee had repeatedly been 
warned to change this behavior. It was behavior of such an offensive nature and of such 
concern to the employer that the employer sought for and obtained from the employee a 
promise to never let it happen again. Therefore, there is no question the behavior was 
"continued or repeated" by the employee. The first element should unquestionably be met. 
B. Ms. Mason Had the Requisite Knowledge. 
The employee also had the required knowledge. Utah Administrative Code R994-
405-202(2) defines knowledge. 
"The worker must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected. 
There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer; 
however, it must be shown that the worker should have been able to anticipate 
the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be 
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected 
behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal 
standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the worker had 
knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the worker should have 
been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer 
had a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, 
it generally must have been followed for knowledge to be established, except 
in the case of very severe infractions, including criminal actions. 
Ms. Mason's activities fit squarely within the definition provided for by the rule. Ms. Mason 
certainly had knowledge of the conduct expected. She had been warned on several occasions 
and had made a promise to properly clock in and out. At that time, as on prior occasions, she 
received a clear explanation of the expected behavior. The promise also demonstrates the 
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specific warning. There simply cannot be any question Ms. Mason knew she was to clock 
in and out properly. 
The employer had made repeated requests and warnings to the employee to clock in 
and out correctly. This fact was referenced by the lower Court in it's decision. She should 
have "been able to anticipate the negative effect of [her] conduct." See Utah Admin. Code 
994-405-202(2) (2005). Ms. Mason testified during the hearing she understood it was a 
problem for her to continue to fail to clock in and out correctly and both the employer and 
the supervisor had instructed her it was their expectation she correct that behavior. See 
Transcript p. 34, In. 22-42. Additionally, Mr. Hill (another employee), the supervisor, and 
Mr. Timmons (the owner/employer) all testified that those conversations had taken place and 
Ms. Mason knew of their expectations in that regard. See Transcript p 13, In. 20-31; p. 24, 
In. 19-36; p. 30, In. 1-2. Each of them testified Ms. Mason was repeatedly verbally warned 
she needed to clock in. When she failed to do so, and had another employee clock her in on 
a day when she was not even working, she was terminated. That culminating event, 
however, was after a long track record of failing repeatedly to conform to the requirements 
for employment. The employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior, warnings 
had previously been given, an ultimate warning given attached with a promise to correct the 
objectionable behavior. The fact she made this promise is ample evidence she had 
knowledge of the behavior which needed correcting. This satisfies the knowledge 
requirements. 
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C. Ms. Mason Had Control of Her Decisions. 
The employee's conduct was also within her control, the third requirement for a just 
cause termination. Utah Admin. Code r994-405-202(3) defines control. 
"(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment 
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued 
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected 
of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element 
of control if the claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may be 
necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While 
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean 
benefits will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a 
discharge due to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown that the 
claimant had the ability to perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In 
general, if the claimant made a good faith effort to meet the job requirements 
but failed to do so due to a lack of skill or ability and a discharge results, just 
cause is not established." 
This was not an isolated instance. This was continued inefficiency and repeated carelessness. 
The definition requires the required performance be reasonable. It would certainly seem 
reasonable for an employee who sells clothing and runs a cash register, to punch a time clock. 
Millions of employees do that every day in this country. Imagine the chaos in the workplace 
if this policy is adopted in Utah. It will make Utah employment records suspect, because 
employees will no longer need to follow their employer's policy on accurate time record 
keeping. Ms. Mason had the ability to clock in and out correctly. If a review was made of 
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her overall performance of clocking in and out a very great percentage of the time would not 
show any error in that performance. She had the ability to do it correctly, nevertheless, she 
chose not to do so. Forgetfulness might have been an excuse prior to Ihe first warning, 
maybe even the second, but such an excuse lacks credibility when it has been pointed out 
many, many times. Control over her performance is demonstrated. It was also promised. 
To not find that element satisfied is not reasonable. 
II. Having Met All Requirements, Ms. Mason Was Terminated With Just 
Cause, and Benefits Should Be Denied. 
Respondent lastly argues this is a situation where although discharge might have been 
appropriate, denial of unemployment benefits is not. The cases cited in support of that 
proposition are inapposite to this situation. In the case of Buick v. Department of 
Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the employee was discharged after 
failing to come to work and providing a questionable medical excuse for that failure. Judge 
Orme found that case to "just barely" be within the realm of rationality. Id. The possibility 
that there actually might have been a medical excuse allowed the Board to conclude 
unemployment benefits should be awarded. Id. Unlike this case, there was no immediately 
preceding warning to correct behavior, rather, the cause for termination was based upon one 
incident. It is not even "just barely" rational or reasonable not to find just cause when an 
employee directly breaches a commitment. To then obtain "permission" from another 
supervisor, without disclosing the commitment, only adds fuel to the fire. Those alone 
demonstrate just cause properly should have been found to terminate Ms. Mason. 
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Respondent next relies upon Northwest Foods v. Board of Review, 731 P.2d 470 (Utah 
1986), to support the assertion Ms. Mason did not show volitional conduct in this case. In 
Northwest Foods, the employee, who had a history of inappropriate emotional outbursts 
while at work, was instructed to take a week long vacation. Id. Though she was not 
instructed to stay away from her place of employment during that week, when she visited her 
employment to pick up some personal items, her employer fired her. Id, Unlike in Northwest 
Foods, where the employee did not know she wasn't supposed to do something, Ms. Mason, 
was well aware of her promise. She simply chose to break it. Respondent states: "She 
simply forgot, on occasion, to use the time clock properly. Although she promised to do 
better, she forgot once more." See Respondent's Brief, p. 25. Those statements are not 
entirely true. Ms. Mason did forget to use the time clock properly, a failure for which she 
was warned specifically about. She did not promise just to do better, she promised to correct 
the behavior. This was after several warnings. The once more, in combination with the other 
issues that occurred, was not a small thing as Respondent argues. Nor was it outside of her 
volitional control. Forgetfulness at that point was not a valid excuse. 
Respondent next cites Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1986). In that case, the employee was responsible for three mishaps while maintaining the 
boiler system of the Logan Regional Hospital. Id. The Board found that the mishaps were 
the result of mistakes or accidents, and therefore an element of fault was lacking. Id. In this 
case, the fault could only be attributed to Ms. Mason. Ms. Mason was the one responsible 
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to keep her promise. Ms. Mason was the one responsible for clocking in and out properly. 
She failed to do that, and the following sequence of events leads one to believe she attempted 
to cover-up that breach. Forgetfulness simply cannot be an excuse forever. 
Petitioner demonstrate sufficient facts to satisfy each element for a finding of just 
cause surrounding the termination of Ms. Mason. The ALJ's holding was neither rational, 
nor reasonable. It rewards cunning and deceit. It initiates a very dangerous precedent for 
employers in Utah as they lose all hope of enforcing accurate record-keeping by their 
employees. All an employee has to do to get out of a commitment to their employer is find 
someone up the chain of command who will authorize the requested conduct and not disclose 
the promise they made. Deceiving that person in the chain of supervisors is fine, and any 
false or misleading manipulation will not matter so long as the employee can secure 
"permission" to violate the policy, the promise and continue the conduct which has provoked 
the warnings. Such a precedent is neither reasonable nor rational and it should not be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Petitioner respectfully requests this 
Court overrule the award of unemployment benefits made in Respondent's favor. Having 
just cause for her termination, she should justly be denied any benefits resulting from her 
dishonest behavior. 
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